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Abstract: This essay utilises the representation of publics in William Shakespeare’s 
Roman plays to reflect on Shakespearean pedagogy and questions of public value. 
Through the use of a complexivist framework, this essay demonstrates how dis-
tinct areas of enquiry—the publics of Shakespeare’s Roman plays and pedagogical 
theory—can usefully illuminate each other and reflect on questions of Shakespeare 
as a public good. Peripheral publics in Titus Andronicus supply a model for transmis-
sion-style pedagogical frameworks; the publics of Julius Caesar and the networks 
of Antony and Cleopatra demonstrate the complexity of educational systems; and, 
finally, the representation of the people in Coriolanus interrogates the conceptuali-
sation of the public and problematises notions of public value in Shakespeare and in 
higher education.
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1. Introduction
In Shakespeare among the Moderns, Richard Halpern notes that:
Among Shakespeare’s works the Roman plays assume singular importance for modern 
political thought because it is there, and there alone, that something like an urban, public 
space emerges. (Halpern, 1997, p. 52)
This paper will examine the publics which generate this “urban, public space” of the Roman plays, and 
more specifically, how these publics can be understood as complex systems. Further, this “complex-
ivist” framing of the publics in Shakespeare’s plays will be used to illuminate the complex pedagogical 
systems in which the plays are now taught. In paralleling analysis of Shakespeare’s plays with reflec-
tions on Shakespearean pedagogy, this paper will encounter what is often referred to as the “public 
value” or “public good”, or what Shakespeare in Coriolanus calls the “public benefit” (Shakespeare, 
2013, 1.1.147). Conventional notions of Shakespeare’s public and pedagogy will first be explored 
through Titus Andronicus, which offers a baseline from which to compare the increasing complexity 
of the public’s construction in Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra, before turning to quantifiable 
public “values” and the construction of Shakespeare’s most challenging public in Coriolanus.
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This presentist approach uses complexity theory to understand better the systemic construction 
of publics in Shakespeare’s Roman plays, and to imagine a way to reconceptualise the relationship 
between Shakespeare, pedagogy and questions of public value. Complexity theory is useful for these 
purposes because it is interested in how complex systems—whether environmental, political, social 
or educational—operate. Its framework is applicable for conceptualising the dynamic behavioural 
patterns of publics in Shakespeare as well as learning processes in Shakespearean pedagogy. 
Complex systems, while incredibly diverse, all share certain core behaviours—including non-lineari-
ty, unpredictability and the ability to self-organise without a leader or controller.
2. Silent publics and transmission teaching in Titus Andronicus
Criticism of the public in Shakespeare’s Roman plays is haunted by accusations of what is more often 
than not identified as “fickleness”. Nicholas Visser points to a critical tradition in which the crowd 
(especially in Julius Caesar) is understood to be fickle and impulsive (Visser, 1994, pp. 23, 25). In his 
edition of Antony and Cleopatra, John Wilders refers to the “notorious fickleness of the Roman mob” 
(Wilders, ed. 1995a, 1.4.44n). Gary Taylor also describes the Roman public of Julius Caesar in these 
generic terms, labelling them “fickle and easy to manipulate” (Taylor, 1994, p. 336).
Visser critiques readings of the fickle crowd as deeply implicated in “conventional notions of col-
lective action” and employing a “view from above” perspective on the public (Visser, 1994, p. 23). But 
in Shakespeare and George Peele’s Titus Andronicus, it is difficult to afford much agency to the public 
portrayed. The construction of the publics in this play appears entirely in keeping with orthodox ac-
cusations: the Roman public is for the most part voiceless and invisible.
It is, though, the people’s political preference which initiates the conflict of Titus Andronicus. 
Communicated via their tribune, Titus’ brother, Marcus—whose familial connection positions him 
less as a spokesperson for the people than as an advocate for the Andronici—we are told that the 
“common voice” nominates Titus for the Roman empery:
Titus Andronicus, the people of Rome,
Whose friend in justice thou hast ever been,
Send thee by me, their tribune and their trust,
This palliament of white and spotless hue,
And name thee in election for the empire[.] (Shakespeare, 1995c, 1.1.182–1.1.186)
However, it is not the “fickle” people who then revolt, but Saturninus. He accuses Titus of trying to 
“rob me of the people’s hearts” (1995c, 1.1.211), although Titus assures him that he “will restore to 
thee | The people’s hearts, and wean them from themselves” (1995c, 1.1.214–1.1.215). Titus’ lan-
guage implies the public’s childish malleability, which cannot be contradicted as the public speak 
only through the mediation of noble voices like Marcus and other unnamed tribunes (who in 
Coriolanus will be made explicitly distinct from the public for whom they speak).
With voices and applause of every sort,
Patricians and plebeians, we create
Lord Saturninus Rome’s great emperor,
And say, “Long live our emperor Saturnine!” (1995c, 1.1.234–1.1.237)
Marcus’ rhetoric here serves as a substitute for the actual “voices and applause” of the public; one 
man stands in for many, in much the same way that Henry V asks its spectators to “[i]nto a thousand 
parts divide one man” (Shakespeare, 1995b, Prologue 23).
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The public depicted here is not understood to be complex: it is predictable, controllable and organ-
ised by leaders. Pedagogically, this is analogous to the outdated but stubbornly lingering model of 
transmission teaching, which still resonates despite a general acknowledgement that teachers are, 
as Roslyn Arnold argues, “no longer expected to simply transmit information” (Arnold, 2004). As 
John Biggs and Catherine Tang reiterate:
The view of university teaching as transmitting information is so widely accepted that 
teaching and assessment the world over are based on it. Teaching rooms and media are 
specifically designed for one-way delivery. (Biggs & Tang, 2011, p. 18)
As Liam Semler describes, in this model of teaching, “the students are given little room for extensive 
freedom of thought” (Semler, 2013, p. 43). These restrictive criteria for learning can result in repeti-
tion or regurgitation, which is precisely what occurs in Titus’ instructions to the “public”, who is again 
voiced by Marcus. Titus declares: “Crown him and say, ‘Long live our emperor!’” (1995c, 1.1.233), to 
which Marcus echoes: “And say, ‘Long live our emperor Saturnine!’” (1995c, 1.1.237). Here, Titus 
“weans” the public through a simple call-and-response.
This transmission model of education is reiterated at the play’s end, in one of the numerous in-
stances of symmetry between the first and last scenes of Titus. Marcus again speaks for and to the 
people, and explicitly gives himself the role of teacher. The citizen body, is, he describes,
By uproars severed, as a flight of fowl
Scattered by winds and high tempestuous gusts,
O let me teach you how to knit again
This scattered corn into one mutual sheaf,
These broken limbs again into one body. (1995c, 5.3.66–5.3.71)
Marcus describes a dismembered public which can only be made cohesive by the authority of a sin-
gle teacher. This relatively silent public must be taught how to become “one body”, despite the fact 
that civil unrest is not one of Titus Andronicus’ many sources of violence. Although Saturninus com-
plains that “disturbers of our peace | Buzz in the people’s ears” (1995c, 4.4.6–4.4.7) and fears that 
“the citizens favour Lucius | And will revolt from me to succour him” (1995c, 4.4.79), the play does 
not depict and is not interested in the public unrest of the citizen body. The fear or potential of public 
revolt haunts the edges of the play, but never manifests. This undefined public, characterised by an 
indirect offstage pressure on the periphery of the narrative, is witnessed only in the anxieties of 
characters, and exerts more of an imagined or latent potential than an actual force. It is a vague, 
dreamy, half-known conceptualisation of the public. Indistinct and theoretical, the public of Titus is 
characterised by its lack of individualisation and lack of direct agency in the broader system.
Most importantly, the Roman public is unable to adapt or learn. In a clear demonstration of the 
ineffectiveness of this transmission model, the public learn nothing by the end of Titus Andronicus. 
They conclude the play with the same request with which they opened it—for an Andronici to take 
the empery. Again, this request is mediated: Emillius states “for well I know | The common voice do 
cry it shall be so” (1995c, 5.3.138–5.3.139). By definition, the act of learning requires some form of 
change in the state of the learner. Change “is what makes the situation educational” (English, 2013, 
p. 130, Italics in original). Titus Andronicus thus leaves itself open to accusations of a closed-loop, 
repetitive pattern of learning. Vernon Guy Dickson believes that Lucius’ final actions in the play “raise 
significant questions about the future of Rome and the precedents he is reiterating” (Dickson, 2009, 
p. 404). With an utterly unchanged populace, the public of Rome in Shakespeare and Peele’s Titus 
Andronicus appears neither complex nor capable of learning.
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3. Complex publics and pedagogy in Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra
Unlike the Rome of Titus Andronicus, the public of Julius Caesar is neither absent nor compliant. It is 
driven not by any centralised authority or teacher, but by collective and unpredictable shifts in mood 
and favour. The crowd is unstable, transitioning from celebratory in the opening scene to murderous 
by the third act, largely by its own whims and never because of any single controller.
This fleeting loyalty, along with the murder of Cinna the Poet, is often given as evidence of the 
mindless mob mentality of Julius Caesar’s public. However, it can also be read as exemplary of com-
plex behavioural patterns: the Roman public is continuously unstable because they are a system 
perennially in flux. Complex systems like crowds, as Neil Johnson explains, “tend to occupy the mid-
dle-ground between order and disorder, making occasional forays toward one or the other and back 
again without the help of any “invisible hand” or central controller” (Johnson, 2009, p. 67). No agent 
within the system has full awareness of or control over the system itself (Cilliers, 1998, pp. 4–5). 
Instead, the systems are structured and maintained by the ongoing interactions of their parts. This 
is known as self-organisation, which is
a process in which pattern at the global level of a system emerges solely from numerous 
interactions among the lower-level components of the system. Moreover, the rules 
specifying interactions among the system’s components are executed using only local 
information, without reference to the global pattern. (Camazine et al., 2001, p. 8)
As Dirk Helbing describes in his work on modelling crowds as complex systems, collective behaviour 
on a macroscopic scale emerges from individual human interactions (Helbing, 2012). The broader 
system is generated by micro-level interactions, which makes self-organisation critical to the gen-
eration and maintenance of complex systems. Thus, the public in Julius Caesar exemplify a complex 
system in the inability of any one agent to retain stable control over it.
Not only is the public of Julius Caesar driven by self-organising, complex patterns of behaviour, but 
it is the public which helps to generate the systemic phenomenon of Caesar himself. The tribune 
Flavius says:
Let no images
Be hung with Caesar’s trophies. I’ll about,
And drive away the vulgar from the streets.
So do you too, where you perceive them thick.
These growing feathers plucked from Caesar’s wing
Will make him fly an ordinary pitch,
Who else would soar above the view of men,
And keep us all in servile fearfulness. (Shakespeare, 1998, 1.1.69–1.1.76)
The tribunes acknowledge that the power of Caesar is not generated by the individual himself: 
Caesar is a phenomenon created by the complex behavioural patterns of the Roman system, and is 
composed of much more than one individual agent. The people provide Caesar with the “growing 
feathers” he needs to “soar above” and become more myth than man.
This directly contradicts critical commentary that understands power in Julius Caesar as “increas-
ingly centralised under the control of Caesar” (Spotswood, 2000, p. 70). It even contradicts how 
some of the characters in the play understand the public. The tribune Murellus labels the public as 
“blocks” and “stones”, “worse than senseless things”! (1998, 1.1.36). Antony, though, is more astute 
in his assessment. He explicitly identifies the public’s agency in the construction of the Roman public 
sphere, telling the people: “You are not wood, you are not stones, but men” (1998, 3.2.143). He real-
ises the active (or reactive) role of the public in shaping the system. The people are not simply ob-
jects to be “worked on” but active agents (Visser, 1994, p. 26). It is not an individual who creates the 
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Caesar phenomenon which lingers long after the physical Caesar’s death; as Brutus says, “we put” 
the power in him (1998, 2.1.16).
The role of the system in generating or “self-organising” the individual is painfully realised by 
Antony in Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra. Antony—unlike Caesar—realises his dependence 
upon the broader network of people around him:
I wish I could be made so many men,
And all of you clapped up together in
An Antony, that I might do you service
As good as you have done. (Shakespeare, 1995a, 4.2.16–4.2.19)
Antony recognises his own incompleteness, fearing himself to be no more than a “mangled shadow” 
(1995a, 4.2.27) that is only given form and substance through its interaction with others. In his fear, 
he bids his servitors to “wait on me tonight” (1995a, 4.2.20), “[t]end me tonight” (1995a, 4.2.24) and 
“stay til death” (1995a, 4.2.30). Later, Antony likens himself to a transient and unformed cloud, as if 
searching to find a vocabulary to explain the concept of distributed self-organisation:
[N]ow thy captain is
Even such a body. Here I am Antony,
Yet cannot hold this visible shape[.] (1995a, 4.14.12–4.14.14)
Antony’s identity is constructed and maintained by the system or network around him. When that 
system becomes unstable and its parts unreliable, Antony loses his form and identity. He under-
stands himself as a “shadow”, “cloud” and shifting “vapour” (1995a, 4.14.3), which “dislimns and 
makes it indistinct | As water is in water” (1995a, 4.24.10–4.24.11).
It is not only Antony who recognises this: Octavius Caesar also realises that Antony’s character is 
produced by a network of relations. Octavius Caesar identifies and exploits Antony’s reliance on 
those around him, imagining Antony’s supporters (who have since defected to Caesar) as an exten-
sion of Antony’s physical form:
Plant those that have revolted in the van
That Antony may seem to spend his fury
Upon himself. (1995a, 4.6.9–4.6.11)
This suggests that Antony’s deserters are like grafted cuttings attached to the body of Caesar’s 
army, but still in some way connected to Antony and capable of causing grief. Both Antony and 
Caesar are well aware that Antony’s power is distributed across his broader network of support, and 
not in his person.
The sense that an individual or phenomenon is generated by a public or at least a network that 
extends well beyond the individual self is echoed when, in Julius Caesar, Cassius says:
And why should Caesar be a tyrant then?
Poor man, I know he would not be a wolf
But that he sees the Romans are but sheep.
He were no lion, were not Romans hinds. (Shakespeare, 1998, 1.3.103–1.3.106)
Caesar is only a “wolf” and “lion” because the Romans act as “sheep” and “hinds”. He grows “mighty” 
(1998, 1.3.107) because Rome is full of “weak straws” (1998, 1.3.108). Caesar is only “illuminate[d]” 
(1998, 1.3.110) thanks to the “trash” of Rome (1998, 1.3.108). Shakespeare’s verb choice is telling; he 
uses this illumination image repeatedly to indicate that Caesar is not a self-lit phenomenon: the light 
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is projected upon him by the public. It is Rome’s perception of Caesar that irradiates him; their acqui-
escing weakness acts as a foil to his brilliance. We see this in Brutus’ warning that “[i]t is the bright 
day that brings forth the adder” (1998, 2.1.14), again implying that it is external light which imbues 
Caesar with power.
This illumination imagery recurs in Coriolanus, in which the tribune Sicinius describes how the 
public’s “blaze” could be taught to “darken” Coriolanus:
This, as you say, suggested
At some time when his soaring insolence
Shall teach the people—which time shall not want,
If he be put upon’t, and that’s as easy
As to set dogs on sheep—will be his fire
To kindle their dry stubble, and their blaze
Shall darken him forever. (Shakespeare, 2013, 2.1.247–2.1.253)
In Julius Caesar, the public’s trash enables Caesar to burn bright by reflection, whereas in Coriolanus 
the people’s kindled “dry stubble” will consume him. Shakespeare repeats the same image in both 
plays to illustrate the complex relationship between public figure and the common public.
Shakespeare also repeats the reference to teaching the public in Titus Andronicus and Coriolanus. 
Sicinius’ notion of “teaching” (2013, 2.1.249) is different to Marcus’ in Titus: although Brutus and 
Sicinius—both, like Marcus, tribunes—aim to “suggest” (2013, 2.1.238) that Coriolanus hates the 
people, what Sicinius believes will teach the people is not the tribunes’ influence but Coriolanus’ own 
“soaring insolence” (2013, 2.1.248). This is a more effective pedagogical method than Marcus’ notion 
of transmission teaching in Titus Andronicus; Sicinius’ experiential learning model demonstrates a 
more developed and complex notion of educational strategy.
In our own modern context, educational systems are increasingly understood to be complex sys-
tems. A learner, a classroom and a Shakespeare play can all be identified as complex systems. This 
means that in secondary and tertiary English classes, “the production of meaning […] can be said to 
involve ‘complex systems of complex systems’” (Lancaster, 2013, p. 1270). Most educators would 
probably agree with the complexivist concept that learning is what Keith Morrison calls an unpre-
dictable “joint voyage of exploration, not simply of recycling given knowledge” (Morrison, 2008, p. 
23). This is an almost ubiquitous understanding of the dynamism of learning.
However, there is a difference between “espoused theories” (what we say) and “theories-in-use” 
(what we do) (see Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978). We may understand that the system is really gener-
ated by the distributed agencies of its parts—learners, educators, texts, institutions, environments 
and so forth—just as the phenomena of Caesar and Antony are not generated by the men them-
selves but rather by the systems and publics in which they are situated. However, in practice, system 
constraints may require educators to behave as if the system is non-complex, with learning out-
comes predictable and controllable. As Sharon Zizkovic argues,
While complex adaptive systems theory has been recognised as an appropriate way 
to address this type of problem, complexity-accepting strategies are difficult for public 
administrations because they are at odds with their current dominant logic. (Zizkovic, 2015)
Complexivist strategies are “difficult for governments”, she adds, because governments have needs 
“that are more easily satisfied when there are clear relationships between cause and effect”. We 
may understand learning as a joint voyage of exploration, but in the restrictive realities of educa-
tional institutions, this may be subordinated to the representation of knowledge for assessment. 
This occurs
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in spite of the often-heard claim that the processes of learning are as important as its 
products. As a result, for example, although students may be encouraged to learn about a 
novel by musing about circumstances and events that aren’t explicitly developed in the text, 
in the end the teacher would evaluate their learning, not on what might have happened but 
on what did happen. (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2000, p. 205, Italics in original)
There is clear tension in attempting to account for the complex unpredictability of learning within a 
deterministic and rigid pedagogical framework, just as there is tension between the self-organised, 
decentralised, complex nature of power in the publics of Shakespeare’s Roman plays, and a demon-
strated tendency (within and outside the plays) to interpret that power as conversely centralised in 
one individual. This analogy between complex publics and pedagogy thus illustrates a shared strain 
between complex behavioural patterns and the inadequate non-complexivist models and frame-
works used to understand that behaviour.
Complexity theory thus enables recognition of the self-organisation of the Roman public of Julius 
Caesar and of our educational institutions. However, this also reveals the difficulty these systems 
have in recognising their complex patterns of behaviour. In this conflict between the complexity of 
the public in Shakespeare and the varied and conflicting interpretations of that public, the difficulty 
of interpreting the crowd is made plain. As Ian Munro observes, “what particularly marks the space 
of the crowd is its illegibility, its resistance to being read” (Munro, 2005, p. 10, Italics in original). A 
similar illegibility and resistance is evident in the public of Coriolanus, which provides a final example 
of the rich parallel between the complexity of publics and pedagogies.
4. Quantifying publics and public value in Coriolanus and Shakespearean pedagogy
In Stefan Collini’s What are Universities For?, he emphasises the limitations of quantifying the “value” 
of tertiary education:
Any discussion of the place of universities in contemporary society will inevitably be driven 
to articulate, in however rudimentary terms, some sense of human purposes beyond that 
of accumulating wealth. Or so one might think. Yet it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that 
the greater part of public discourse about universities at present reduces to the following 
dispiriting proposition: universities need to justify getting more money and the way to do this 
is by showing that they help to make more money. (Collini, 2012, p. x)
The public “value” of Shakespeare in this context relates not only to idealistic conceptualisations of 
the term, but also to questions of economic value. Economistic and individualistic discourse, increas-
ingly prevalent in reference to contemporary educational institutions, is also pervasive in Coriolanus; 
a play similarly concerned with a quantifiable understanding of “value”. The play seeks to come to 
terms with the public, and with Coriolanus himself, through a rhetoric of numbers. The characters 
understand their world through measurements: Coriolanus repeatedly divides, doubles or reduces 
things to specific numbers, or “arithmetic”, in Cominius’ words (2013, 3.1.247). In addition to the 
play’s focus on payments, quantification and sharing of spoils, Coriolanus revolves around the im-
agery of halving and doubling—outdoing even The Merchant of Venice in references to the word 
“half”.1 Coriolanus announces that
Were half to half the world by th’ears and he
Upon my party, I’d revolt to make
Only my wars with him. (2013, 1.1.228–1.1.230)
The Roman army is “cloven” (2013, 1.4.22); Cominius promises that the soldiers will “[d]ivide in all 
with us” (2013, 1.6.87); Coriolanus bemoans that he is “half through” (2013, 2.3.121) the “custom of 
request” (2013, 2.3.140), and later disparages
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This double worship,
Where one part does disdain with cause, the other
Insult without all reason[.] (2013, 3.1.143–3.1.145)
A senator imagines that “our good city | Cleave in the midst and perish” (2013, 3.2.29); in the fourth 
act, imagery returns to “double bosoms” and friends “who twin” in love “[u]nseparable” (2013, 
4.4.13, 4.4.15–4.4.16); and Aufidius offers Coriolanus “half of my commission” (2013, 4.5.140). The 
third Servingman of the Volscians tells his co-workers that “our general is cut i’th’ middle and but 
one half of what he was yesterday, for the other has half, by the entreaty and grant of the whole 
table” (2013, 4.5.199–4.5.202). This discourse of quantification and division is pertinent because it 
relates to the conceptualisation of the public and to what Annabel Patterson calls “the play’s most 
important contrast—that between the many and the one”. She identifies how the play registers the 
plebeians’ plurality by “their ordinal numbering” in contrast to Coriolanus’ “singularity”. Like Visser, 
in his treatment of Julius Caesar, Patterson argues for a re-evaluation of the plebeians in Coriolanus. 
They are not, she argues, “the pathetic nonentities, aimless and inarticulate”, that other critics have 
believed them to be:
the plebeians themselves (as distinct from their tribunes) are generously represented, and 
the popular voice, as they themselves speak it, has genuine grievances to express. This was 
Shakespeare’s point of furthest reach in exploring the claims of the many against the few. 
(Patterson, 1989, pp. 129–130, 132, 11)
However, although Patterson argues for their anonymity, the multitude of Coriolanus refuses to stay 
as one undifferentiated mass—as they do in Titus. In complexivist terms, the tension between the 
parts of the system and the whole system drives the play. This pattern is immediately evident in the 
complaints of the First Citizen in the opening scene:
We are accounted poor citizens, the patricians good. What authority surfeits on would 
relieve us. If they would yield us but the superfluity while it were wholesome, we might 
guess they relieved us humanely. But they think we are too dear. The leanness that 
afflicts us, the object of our misery, is as an inventory to particularise their abundance; our 
sufferance is a gain to them. (2013, 1.1.13–1.1.20)
The citizens are aware of an interdependent relationship between plebeian and patrician. One group 
must starve so another can surfeit. It is this dangerous argument that is seen in discourse around 
the value of the humanities, particularly in the spectre of the “two cultures” and the false dichotomy 
that creates a world in which the humanities must demonstrate its worth against the Goliath figure 
of the sciences. It is because of this sentiment that critics like Jonathan Bate posit the following hy-
pothetical scenario:
Imagine a civil servant responsible for the distribution of the research budget. Imagine them 
saying “I don’t lose any sleep at night over the spending of taxpayers’ money on medical 
research, but I do lose sleep over the spending of it on humanities research; I like riding my 
horse, but I don’t expect the taxpayer to pay for me to do so.” Imagine, then, that you have 
the ear of that civil servant, or for that matter the minister to whom they report, for a few 
sentences. What will you say to help them to rest more easily at night on this matter of the 
taxpayer and humanities research? (Bate, 2011, p. 7)
This is one small way where the public value of the humanities, and the public good of Shakespeare, 
comes to the fore: a play like Coriolanus provides a model for understanding and critiquing systems which 
perpetuate these kinds of value-laden discourses that seek quantifiable ways of understanding the world.
Coriolanus repeatedly attempts to segment or dismember both the individual self and the public: 
Coriolanus—like Antony in Antony and Cleopatra—becomes increasingly fragmented. In addition to 
Martius’ isolation from the Roman body, the play’s language divides Martius even from himself:
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By your patience
If ‘gainst yourself you be incensed, we’ll put you,
Like one that means his proper harm, in manacles,
Then reason safely with you. (2013, 1.9.54–1.9.57)
Coriolanus is further fragmented when he imagines himself comprising the spirits of eunuchs, vir-
gins, babies, knaves, schoolboys and beggars (2013, 3.2.112–3.2.121). More broadly, the play envis-
ages its people as “shreds” (2013, 1.1.203) and “fragments” (2013, 1.1.217); the Roman power is in 
“parcels” (2013, 1.2.32). In repeatedly enacting this rhetorical violence upon the holistic idea of a 
single body and a common people, Coriolanus seems to be trying to find an answer to the question: 
“What is the city but the people?” (2013, 3.1.199).
The actual components and composition of “Rome” become increasingly perplexing. Coriolanus 
holds a contradictory view, describing Aufidius as “the man of my soul’s hate” for “[p]iercing our 
Romans” (2013, 1.5.10–1.5.11), while simultaneously exhibiting no respect for or enduring loyalty to 
individual Romans. Coriolanus may have no particular loyalty to specific individuals, but he has cre-
ated an imagined conception of Rome, much as Michael Werner describes the construction of the 
“public” as “a special kind of virtual social object”. Werner argues:
When we understand images and texts as public, we do not gesture to a statistically 
measurable series of others. We make a necessarily imaginary reference to the public as 
opposed to other individuals. Public opinion, for example, is understood as belonging to a 
public rather than to scattered individuals. (Werner, 2002, pp. 55, 161)
In Coriolanus’ tendency to quantify, fragment, dismember and divide into numbers, parts and halves, 
the play works against the ideal construction of a public as unified. It is the reality of the “scattered 
individuals”, as opposed to the romance of the “imaginary” public, which becomes problematic.
This focus on the “scattered individuals” amongst the nameless “public” is evident in the Third 
Citizen’s own description of the multitude not as a cohesive whole but rather as “diverse”:
We have been called so of many, not that our heads are some brown, some black, some 
abram, some bald, but that our wits are so diversely coloured; and truly, I think if all our 
wits were to issue out of one skull, they would fly east, west, north, south, and their consent 
of one direct way should be at once to all the points o’th’ compass. […] We are not to stay 
together, but to come by him where he stands, by ones, by twos, and by threes. He’s to make 
his requests by particulars, wherein every one of us has a single honour in giving him our 
own voices with our own tongues. (2013, 2.3.17–2.3.23, 2.3.40–2.3.44)
The Third Citizen echoes the conceptualisation of Rome as a “flight of fowl | Scattered by winds” in 
Titus Andronicus (1995c, 5.3.67–5.3.68). Yet, importantly, Coriolanus is the only Roman play in which 
the public self-identify; they are not only defined by the language of the patrician class.
This dismantles any sense of a unified or common “public opinion” because, as we were reminded 
by Werner above, the concept of the public does not work if it is revealed as constituted by “scat-
tered individuals”. Werner argues:
The ideal unity of the public sphere is best understood as an imaginary convergence point 
that is the backdrop of critical discourse in each of these contexts and publics—an implied but 
abstract point that is often referred to as “the public” or “public opinion” and by virtue of that 
fact endowed with legitimacy and the ability to dissolve power. A “public” in this context is a 
special kind of virtual social object, enabling a special mode of address. (Werner, 2002, p. 55)
Page 10 of 13
Hansen, Cogent Arts & Humanities (2016), 3: 1235854
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2016.1235854
It is precisely this endowment which the Citizens here consider: “We have power in ourselves to do 
it, but it is a power that we have no power to do” (2013, 2.3.4–2.3.5). In this highly self-reflective 
moment, the Citizens here compare what they perceive to be their real situation with the idea of the 
“many-headed multitude” (2013, 2.3.15–2.3.16). This distinction between the citizens as a group of 
individuals and the citizens that comprise a public with its attendant “powers” is made plain.
This can be better understood through the lens of complexity theory. What the Citizens here iden-
tify is a difference between the parts of the system and its whole. A complex system is generated by 
the interaction of its component parts; this interaction produces or creates the system itself. One 
cannot simply divide a complex system into parts and understand how those parts produce the 
whole, because the whole is created only in the interaction of those parts—in their relationships—
not by the parts in isolation. This is very different from the conventional understanding of system as 
“a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan” (Oxford 
English Dictionary, n.d., My emphasis).
The complex, unpredictable, dynamic interactions of the various parts of Rome generate the “im-
aginary convergence point”, an abstract point—as Werner describes—which we identify broadly as 
“the public”. But, upon dissecting or fragmenting that public into parts, the whole system disappears 
from view and we cannot locate any semblance of a “public”. We find only parts. Coriolanus is trou-
bled by this distinction. The play differentiates between the non-specific idea of the city and the 
specific people who inhabit it. In planning to attack Rome, Coriolanus imagines a whole: Rome, he 
says, is as “a pile | Of noisome musty chaff” (2013, 5.1.25–5.1.26) which contains only “one poor 
grain or two” (2013, 5.1.27). It is Menenius who forces the play to again transition from a vague 
conception of an imaginary “public” to the specifics of the individuals which people it:
I am one of those; his mother, wife, his child
And this brave fellow too: we are the grains,
You are the musty chaff, and you are smelt
Above the moon. We must be burnt for you. (2013, 5.1.28–5.1.32)
Coriolanus struggles to express how individual people relate to the notion of the public. The Rome in 
Coriolanus seeks to understand how its own people function as a social system, but it relies on out-
dated “pretty tale[s]” like the belly fable, which even the teller, Menenius, admits is archaic:
It may be you have heard it,
But since it serves my purpose, I will venture
To stale’t a little more. (2013, 1.1.85–1.1.87)
The struggles of the public of Coriolanus to find a way to understand the complexity of their social 
interactions is a useful lens for reflection on the discourses which shape a contemporary under-
standing of the “public”. This is exemplified in the play’s tension between what is seen as a “public” 
and “private” good, a question raised increasingly in regard to higher education today (Collini, 2012, 
p. 14). Leigh Dale points to the assumption “that if education were to be publicly funded it should 
serve the needs of the state rather than those of the individual” (Dale, 2012, p. 16). But a clear con-
ceptualisation of public or “state” good is highly problematic, not least because of the difficulties in 
defining what constitutes a “public” and a “value”. As John Frow states, the question of value is both 
“difficult” and “perhaps embarrassing” (Frow, 1993, p. 208). Further, if Shakespeare education is a 
public good, the question of how it is dispersed to the public remains: is it, as John Bell argues, “up 
to theatre companies to keep [Shakespeare] alive by performing it”? (Marks, 2014). The role of cer-
tain individuals or subgroups in the definition and dissemination of public goods raises further ques-
tions regarding the relationship between the public as an imaginary abstract point and the specific 
persons who comprise it. Addressing the difficulty in shifting between the extremes of “scattered 
individuals” and the “imaginary” public is essential to clarifying and pursuing these questions.
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As Coriolanus illustrates, the closer you look at a system, the less you see the bigger picture. As the 
public in Coriolanus comes into much closer view than it does in Titus Andronicus, Antony and 
Cleopatra and even Julius Caesar, it becomes harder to comprehend: as does our understanding of 
the public good. The patricians and the Roman citizens each have a very different understanding of 
what is “good” for the public. The citizens understand “public good” as the right to be fed; Menenius 
argues that they will profit indirectly from the “public benefit” transmitted from patrician belly to the 
body’s “mutinous members” (2013, 1.1.143–1.1.150). This is uncomfortably close to Collini’s argu-
ment, when he points out that
it is sometimes argued that there is no reason why those who do not themselves go to 
university should contribute, through their taxes, to the costs of those who do. But this is to 
treat a university education and whatever flows from it as a purely private good. […] There 
are a great number of forms of public provision of which I may not be a direct beneficiary but 
which I believe society collectively should attempt to support. (Collini, 2012, p. 97)
There are echoes of Menenius’ argument here: an individual may not benefit directly, but the belly 
feeds all parts of the system.
Complexity theory offers a different, more precise vocabulary for understanding how publics and 
educational systems operate. Its further application may also help to refine how the humanities and 
Shakespearean pedagogy can be supported in public discourse. Complexity theory requires us to 
rethink how our educational institutions and publics are structured, and steers attention away from 
a rigid focus on quantifiable benefits, instead understanding educational processes and publics as 
open-ended, unpredictable and dynamic.
5. Conclusion
This parallel discussion of Roman publics, Shakespearean pedagogy and public value uses a com-
plexivist framework to demonstrate how two distinct topics—publics and pedagogies—can usefully 
illuminate each other.
An examination of the peripheral publics of Titus Andronicus supplied a model for transmission-
style pedagogical frameworks, while a reading of distributed agency in Julius Caesar and Antony 
and Cleopatra demonstrated the complexity of public systems and the decentralisation of Caesar 
and Antony. In particular, Julius Caesar’s difficulty in articulating its self-organisation highlights 
how the complexity of a system does not necessarily mean that a system’s institutions are de-
signed to recognise or support that complexity. Finally, this paper’s exploration of the language of 
Coriolanus reveals the vexed boundary between an imaginary public and specific individuals, prob-
lematising the concept of “public value”. Its preoccupation with quantification and the public good 
aligns with contemporary concerns surrounding higher education and the public value of 
Shakespeare and the humanities.
One of the public values of Shakespeare is his ability to aid in interrogating assumptions about the 
concept of the “public” how we construct our attitudes towards the idea of the public; and how we 
decide that there is a consensus as to what is “good” or “valuable” for that public. This is perhaps 
annoying circular, but Shakespeare’s construction of publics—and perhaps even more interestingly, 
how his characters, audiences, readers and critics have interpreted those publics—can be of use in 
reflecting on our own assumptions and biases about the relationship between Shakespeare, peda-
gogy and the “public” in twenty-first century Australia.
This idea, of course, is not a new one. Jürgen Habermas, in tracking the “transformation” of the 
public in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pointed to “the rise of critical discussion of 
art, music, and literature” as one of the catalysts for a movement towards a different notion of the 
public as “composed of private persons exercising rational-critical discourse in relation to the state 
and power” (Werner, 2002, pp. 46–47). There is a risk here of simplification in assuming that 
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engagement with the humanities is somehow distinct from or outside of state power or this tricky 
term, “the public”. But if critical discussion of literature can help to formulate different notions of the 
public, then critical analysis of Shakespeare’s constructions of the public through the lens of com-
plexity theory may help to promote a clearer understanding of the relationship between Shakespeare, 
contemporary publics and their learning patterns, educational systems and values.
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